El 31 de agosto de 2017, las Fuerzas Armadas de Colombia dieron de baja a Roberto Vargas Gutiérrez, alias Gavilán, segundo hombre al mando del Clan del Golfo. Esta banda criminal se caracteriza por ser el principal grupo armado organizado (GAO) de Colombia, controlando más del 45% del narcotráfico nacional, explotando centenares de minas ilegales y haciendo una presencia fuerte en 22 de los 32 departamentos del país.

Los miembros del Clan del Golfo provienen en su mayoría de las extintas Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) y de algunas guerrillas colombianas, como el Ejército Popular de Liberación; lo que evidencia que sus integrantes llevan una carrera criminal importante, basada en el negocio del narcotráfico y la intimidación directa contra la sociedad civil.

La evidencia empírica sugiere que, según el tipo de GAO, el descabezamiento de grandes líderes criminales, insurgentes o terroristas, produce escaladas de conflicto entre los actores involucrados. Este efecto se ve principalmente porque quedan cabezas pequeñas que luchan entre ellas para el liderazgo del grupo, o porque el gobierno central o local rompe con el status quo y esto produce una reacción bélica en los diferentes actores. Por lo anterior, es esperable que la muerte de Gavilán produzca un aumento de homicidios, extorsiones o explotación minera sin precedentes, entre otras acciones violentas por parte de este grupo armado.

Sin embargo, la respuesta de alias ‘Otoniel’ fue contraria a lo que sugiere la teoría. El máximo líder del Clan del Golfo solicitó que se estudiara la posibilidad de acoger su organización criminal a la justicia colombiana, con el objetivo de involucrar a las Autodefensas Gaitanistas (AGC) y, de esta manera, obtener la paz completa.

En respuesta a este comunicado, el presidente Juan Manuel Santos le solicitó al Ministro de Justicia y al Fiscal General que se estudie la posibilidad presentada por ‘Otoniel’; aclarando que este proceso sería un sometimiento, más no una negociación. La diferencia es importante, si se considera que una negociación exige un tiempo mayor y una implementación de los acuerdos, como en el caso de las negociaciones de paz con las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) en La Habana, mientras que un sometimiento : se acuerda la entrega de armas, la información de la organización, el tipo de justicia que se aplicará y el pago de la pena.

Dado el contexto anterior, surge la pregunta: ¿qué podría pasar en el futuro con este grupo criminal?

Al igual que otros investigadores, vemos con pesimismo el sometimiento a la justicia del Clan del Golfo, principalmente por tres características que evidencian su heterogeneidad:

1. las diversas proveniencias de sus integrantes – ex paramilitares, ex soldados, ex guerrilleros, delincuencia común, entre otros – que forma un grupo sin ideología clara y con intereses y pasados sumamente complejos de afrontar
2. su variada distribución por el territorio colombiano, pues aunque tengan fuerte presencia en el Urabá, gran parte de su organización se sitúa en cabeceras municipales y ciudades intermedias
3. la disparidad de negocios que tienen los frentes de la GAO, mientras que algunos se concentran en el negocio del narcotráfico, otros se focalizan en explotación minera o extorsión a grandes compañías ganaderas y petroleras.

Por otro lado, vemos con preocupación las dificultades legales de entrar a un proceso de paz con una banda criminal. El Fiscal General ha insistido en el vacío jurídico que posee el código penal colombiano, para llevar a cabo un sometimiento a la justicia de un GAO.

Primero, por la dificultad de hacer un reconocimiento individual de sus integrantes, pues la mayoría no cuentan con una cédula de identificación que ayude a su reconocimiento.

Segundo, por la necesidad de unas actas de sometimiento, en la que los integrantes del Clan del Golfo reconozcan su participación en actividades criminales y, de esta manera, la Fiscalía pueda hacer su respectiva orden de captura.

Tercero, por las demoras del proceso judicial colombiano, en los cuales un caso puede durar más de dos años sin arrojar mayores resultados.

Cuarto, dado que las víctimas tomaron un rol importante en la política colombiana tras el acuerdo de paz con las FARC, un posible sometimiento a la justicia por parte del Clan del Golfo implicaría una incertidumbre sobre cuál sería la forma de reparación de las víctimas y si aplicaría la reparación y el perdón y olvido de otros procesos.

A pesar de los retos jurídicos y políticos, los costos de perder esta oportunidad para acabar con el grupo criminal más grande del país son altos. Estamos frente a la posibilidad de ingresar a la legalidad a más de dos mil colombianos, los cuales en su mayoría son hombres jóvenes que viven en condiciones de marginalidad y con altos riesgos de continuar en la ilegalidad. En el marco de un posconflicto, el fin del Clan del Golfo abre la oportunidad de acabar con muchas fuentes de violencia que se presentan en las regiones; asimismo facilitaría procesos como la sustitución de los cultivos ilícitos o la entrada del Estado colombiano a rincones del país donde tradicionalmente no ha tenido una presencia.

Sin embargo, para que el desarme, la desmovilización y la reintegración de esta banda criminal se realicen correctamente, debe tenerse en cuenta varios de factores de riesgo. La presencia de otros GAO, como los frentes disidentes de las FARC, por ejemplo, dificulta que haya total adherencia a los acuerdos de todos los integrantes del Clan del Golfo, pues continuará el incentivo de seguir en la criminalidad o la presión para no dejar su negocio. Por otro lado, el limitado capital político del Presidente Juan Manuel Santos, el cual – a pesar de haber recibido un premio Nobel de Paz y poseer varios reconocimientos internacionales – cuenta con una desaprobación del 72% de los colombianos, lo que dificulta tener un respaldo de los partidos políticos y la sociedad civil.

En conclusión, el crimen organizado, en particular el Clan del Golfo, representa una amenaza fundamental para el proceso de paz con las FARC y para la estabilidad social y política de Colombia. Ha sido muy difícil contrarrestar su accionar delincuencial, dadas unas políticas antidrogas mal enfocadas y la dificultad de tener presencia estatal en todos los lugares del país.

Asimismo, es sorprendente la respuesta de ‘Otoniel’ a la muerte de su segundo al mando, ofreciendo la posibilidad de terminar su conflicto con el Estado. Pues como se presentó anteriormente, la evidencia demuestra que en conflictos con bandas criminales o narcotraficantes, suele incrementar los índices de violencia tras el descabezamiento de un gran líder.

Sin embargo, consideremos que la posibilidad de realizar un proceso de desmovilización con este grupo armado es una oportunidad que no debe perderse, aprovechando la salida de las FARC y el proceso de paz con el ELN, es la forma de llevar presencia estatal a todas las regiones del país y concretar el camino hacia la paz en Colombia.

In most OECS nations, citizenship is available at a cost. It can be purchased by almost anyone who can afford it. There is no qualifying period and no residential requirement. All that is needed is a one-off payment into either an agreed form of investment or to a government development fund, plus background checks on the individual concerned

Depending on the location and scheme chosen, the basic cost is now between US$0.1m and US$0.4m plus fees.  Not only does this confer a passport, but it also offers free movement within CARICOM, and visa free entry to many other countries. At further cost, citizenship can be extended to families and relatives.

The creation of such Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programmes has been mainly driven by the the Caribbean governments concerned need to find new ways to raise revenue because of their otherwise limited capacity to compete globally.

St Kitts and Nevis, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and St Lucia have such arrangements, but St Vincent has not. Belize suspended its controversial programme in 2002.

For the most part, such schemes showed early promise. Slides shown in June this year, by Trevor Alleyne, the IMF Division Chief for the Caribbean, at a conference on global mobility and tax strategies, suggest that taken together, the contribution made to GDP by Caribbean CBI programmes peaked in 2014. Then, for example, St Kitts earned 14% of it GDP from citizenship, enabling it to substantially offset what otherwise would have been negative growth. However, seen since then its programme earnings has gone into a slow decline.

In a probable reflection of this and the need to stimulate renewed interest, its government recently announced a new route to citizenship at a basic rate of US$0.15m, ‘a proportion of which’, it said, would be paid into a hurricane relief fund.  The decision appears to make redundant a part of its existing programme which offers citizenship for a minimum contribution of USD$0.25m to the country’s National Development Fund

To be fair, it may also reflect a comment made recently by the Governor of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), Dr Timothy Antoine.  Launching the ECCB’s strategic plan earlier this month, he urged OECS Governments to consistently set aside a portion of citizenship revenues to use as leverage to attract climate finance under the Paris Climate Accord.

In contrast, in Dominica, and to a much lesser extent in Grenada, the contribution made by citizenship programmes to GDP has been increasing. In Dominica’s case, its National Development Programme earnings before Hurricane Maria struck, had reportedly reached US$50m per month: sums that were being used to pay down debt, support public works, as well as to provide budgetary support and employment.

In an indirect confirmation of the value of Dominica’s low basic fee of US$0.1m, and the fierce competition now existing between OECS nations for citizenship applications, Antigua this month reduced its basic fee for citizenship to the same US$0.1m level.

The least successful CBI programme has been St Lucia’s. Earlier this year, its government halved the previous cost of citizenship for individuals, also to US$0.1m, and adjusted downwards the fee for all other categories, making the country’s programme for a short time the cheapest in the region. It also lifted a self-imposed limit on the number of applications that could be processed annually, and revoked previous requirements relating to an applicant’s net worth on the basis that other countries were offering discounts or incentives.

What is emerging from this apparent race to the bottom are several issues:

1. First, well conceived, well administered programmes linked to national development programmes, where judiciously applied and with clear outcomes, appear to offer the best avenues for government and countries to reap the greatest rewards.
2. Second, global and inter-regional competition suggests the emergence of a zero-sum game in which nations may seek to offset a decline in income by further reducing pricing. If this happens, it follows that a higher number of successful applicants will be required if income from citizenship is to sustain or enhance GDP growth.
3. Third, if governments are unable to significantly grow applicant numbers through price reductions, or through encouraging greater citizenship related investment in real estate or bonds, they may have to turn again to tourism to increase revenue, and to new tax breaks to spur investment.

In short, Caribbean CBI programmes may not have as a bright a revenue earning future as they have had in the past.

While many high net worth people continue to seek second or third citizenships, it appears likely that the numbers of applicants per Caribbean country may decrease as global competition grows, at worst accelerating the sector’s decline.

In theory OECS nations with CBI programmes could consider some sort of approach involving harmonisation. However, in the real world of multiple unresolved sub-regional ideological, economic, and personality differences, it is hard to imagine achieving a consensus that lasts.

Unfortunately, OECS governments have shown little willingness to address questions about the sustainability of their citizenship programmes, or to indicate whether they have fresh ideas about the ways in which they might redesign existing schemes to ensure continuing income without lowering fees any further.

All of which is to say nothing about the sometimes-questionable comments and defensive public relations exercises undertaken by some agents selling CBI programmes, about the questions that remain about the due diligence processes some governments pursue, or the serious international concern that has arisen about the issuance of diplomatic passports.

Almost every nation in the world provides a path to citizenship. Despite this, many citizens and some governments in principle object to the idea that nationality is something that can be sold.  In this the Caribbean is no exception.

As long as citizenship programmes exist, questions will also remain about the granting of rights and free movement within CARICOM to those who are not required to reside, make no long-term economic or personal contribution, and who have no historic or cultural affinity to the region.

We have long known that poverty has a negative impact on health. People living in economic disadvantage are at higher risk of experiencing illness and receive medical care when needed. However, the causal chain from disadvantage to disease is hard to disentangle. Living in poverty reduces access to nutritious food, clean water and sanitation. But there are many other pathways by which disadvantage impacts health. Poverty steeply increases stress, which in turn impacts physical and mental health. It also decreases the access to education and key information that can help prevent disease.

Clearly, the relationship between poverty and poor health is not straightforward, but rather a dense web of interrelated factors constantly shaping each other.

Our research looks at one rarely explored aspect of this relationship: health disparities in relation to ethnic-minority status. With very few exceptions, ethnic-minority populations tend to be economically disadvantaged. As a result, one of the main challenges of studying health disparities between minority and majority populations is disentangling the effect of socio-economic marginalisation on health and the “minority” effect on health. We take the case of Afro-Colombians to whether minority status itself can affect health or if instead the differences relate to socio-economic disparities between Afro-Colombians and the general population.

Isolating the effect of ethnic-minority status

Disentangling socio-economic disadvantage and ethnicity in relation to health outcomes in Colombia (and other Latin American countries) is particularly challenging.

Latin America is one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the world. People in the region tend to think of themselves as mestizos, a concept of ethnicity that is “mixed” at its core. The region is also one of the most unequal in the world, and research on health disparities has thus tended to focus on the health effects of class and poverty.

The question of ethnicity and its relation to poor health outcomes is certainly a difficult question to address, as different sources of marginalisation are deeply embedded. Yet, since members of ethnic minorities face chronic discrimination, with knock-on negative effects for health, it is a question that needs to be asked. And the case of Afro-Colombians, who continue to have a fairly cohesive ethnic identity, makes a particularly appropriate case study.

We first sought to determine the nature of health disparities between Afro-Colombians and the general population. To do this, we used nationally representative survey data to evaluate health differences affecting adults and children of African descent. This showed that Afro-Colombian adults are less likely to report “good” or “excellent” health. Adults and children are also more likely to say they were sick in the past month and to have a chronic condition. Afro-Colombian adults are less likely than their counterparts to seek treatment if they feel ill. However, when they seek medical treatment, there are as likely as non-Afro Colombians to receive it.

Importantly, we identified key socio-economic disadvantages affecting Afro-Colombians that could explain the disparities in health. Afro-Colombians adults are less wealthy, have less access to sanitation and are less likely to be insured. Afro-Colombian children live in poorer households, have mothers with less education, and have less access to sanitation than their non-Afro counterparts. They are also less likely to have health insurance.

Because our findings reveal both socio-economic and health disparities between Afro-Colombians and non-Afro Colombians, the next step was to determine which factors best explain identified differences in health. This might be observable (socio-economic status, level of education, access to health care, etc.) or unobservable.

We re-analysed the data using a method that equalises the observable factors and tells us if the differences are still there after “levelling the ground” for everyone. A finding that health differences are not sufficiently explained by observed factors would support the hypothesis of a discrimination effect driving health disparities against the Afro-Colombian population.

What role for discrimination?

Ultimately, we found that health disparities are largely explained by observable variables (i.e. socio-economic status, education, insurance, etc.), but with some important exceptions. Higher perceived morbidity, less treatment-seeking, and lower enrolment in subsidised health-insurance schemes were not successfully explained by observed factors only. This means that the experience of worse general health among Afro-Colombians could also be driven by a discrimination effect.

We also find that Afro-Colombian children are more likely than their non-Afro counterparts to have poor growth. The disparity is not explained by observable variables. Therefore, we found a potentially strong discrimination effect for disparities in height at a given age.

Taken together, our results paint a picture of an Afro-descendant population with increased morbidity, less treatment-seeking, and less enrolment in a health-insurance system that is free to those who qualify.

While the results suggest a discrimination effect behind these disparities, determining the mechanism by which discrimination operates is more challenging. The observational data does not allow us to identify cause-effect relationships. Nevertheless, we explore some possible explanations based on what we know about the relationship between discrimination and health.

Difference, discrimination, and health outcomes

We believe that our results are driven by both structural and internalised forms of discrimination. As such, strategies looking to tackle health disparities amongst this population should address these issues in an integrated manner.

Take for example the finding that Afro-Colombians are less likely to enrol in health-insurance schemes for which they are eligible at no cost. An intervention targeting this problem could focus on increasing the willingness of Afro-Colombians to sign up for health insurance. This would entail tackling individual choice while accounting for the link between discrimination, social identity, and health behaviour. Afro-Colombians face ethnic discrimination in various settings on a regular basis. Chronic experiences of ethnic discrimination are progressively internalised by the individual. Because the person self-identifies as member of the stigmatised ethnic group, some aspects of his/her identity will also be stigmatised. Stigmatised social identities can influence behaviour to a considerable extent. Under certain circumstances, they can impair the group’s ability to respond to available opportunities even after these have been equalised across groups. It is likely that the stigmatised identity negatively affects enrolment for free health insurance among Afro-Colombians. Interventions should thus be designed to address the effect of discrimination on behavioural patterns that have negative health effects.

Yet, the lower enrolment rate of Afro-Colombians can also be studied from an institutional angle that considers the social and structural aspects of discrimination. For instance, it is possible that areas with a higher proportion of Afro-descendants are not prioritised by the enrolment efforts of the health system or may simply lack a nearby enrolment office.

Afro-Colombian households may be less likely to receive subsidised insurance. While indigenous populations, demobilised combatants, or homeless individuals are classified as “special populations” for the purposes of subsidies, the Afro-Colombian population is not. There is evidence that the assignment of subsidies to non-special populations may be discretionary in some circumstances, which could suggest implicit dynamics of institutional discrimination.

More research is required if we are to understand the role of discrimination – both structural and internalised – in the health disparities affecting Afro-Colombians. The more we know, the better equipped we will be to design means of overcoming these disparities. Our study contributes by showing that the ethnicity factor is distinct and adds to the cumulative effect of exclusion. We demonstrate this with indications of objective poorer health (height for age) and reports of subjective experience of poorer health (perceived morbidity) by Afro-Colombian individuals.

We know that those belonging to minority groups across Latin America consistently report poorer health. Building a better understanding of the multiple facets of disadvantage and their distinct impact on health is no small task. However, the production of knowledge from and about Latin America has grown exponentially in the last decades.

It is time for researchers and policy makers in the region to engage in productive discussions to find innovative solutions to these problems. This is a challenging but achievable mission: creativity has never been a scarce resource in Latin America.